For a traffic network with fixed demand of heterogeneous users in terms of their different values of time (VOT), the system performance can be measured either in time unit by the total system travel time (in short, system time), or in monetary unit by the total system travel cost (in short, system cost). Thus we have two different objectives for network optimization, i.e. to minimize system time and to minimize system cost, which naturally gives rise to a bi-objective minimization problem. A Pareto optimum of this bi-objective optimization problem represents a bi-criteria system optimum for network optimization in the sense that, at each Pareto optimum, neither system time nor system cost can be further reduced without increasing the other one. In this paper we prove that any Pareto optimum can be decentralized into multi-class user equilibrium by positive anonymous link tolls. We then bound the system performance gap when optimized by the two different criteria. Specifically, we provide answers to the following questions: When system time is minimized, how far could the corresponding system cost deviate from its minimum value? Conversely, when system cost is minimized, how far could the corresponding system time deviate from its minimum value?
Introduction
The concept of value of time (VOT) plays a pivot role in road pricing analysis as it describes how users make tradeoffs between money and time in response to road toll charges.
Conventional network user equilibrium (UE) model typically assumes that users' VOT are identical, i.e. homogeneous users. With homogeneous users, the first-best congestion pricing theory, namely the theory of marginal cost pricing is well established in general networks for fixed and elastic travel demand. However, it is well known that travelers may value travel time differently, depending on their income levels or travel purposes, and thus heterogeneous users with different VOT have to be considered. In the presence of user heterogeneity, various network equilibrium models are developed by assuming either a discrete set of VOT for several distinct user classes or a continuously distributed VOT across the whole population (e.g. Leurent, 1993; Marcotte and Zhu, 2000; Mayet and Hansen, 2000; Nagurney, 2000a) .
Also, the optimal pricing problems for heterogeneous users with discrete or continuous VOT distributions are investigated extensively (e.g. Dial, 1999a,b; Yang and Zhang, 2002; Yang and Huang, 2004) .
In traffic networks with users having different VOT, the system performance can be measured either in time unit or in cost (monetary) unit, and the two measures are in general mutually inconsistent with each other. In particular, for the case of fixed travel demand, the system performance can be measured either in time unit by the total system travel time (in short, system time), or in monetary unit by the total system travel cost (in short, system cost). From an economic viewpoint, system cost is a more appropriate system disutility measure when users value travel time differently. Nonetheless, system time is a traditional measure of system performance in transportation engineering context, and in the presence of multiple user classes, system time is still a proper measure of the environmental effect of traffic, i.e. the total system travel time roughly determines the total gas emission of vehicles (in this respect, one has to acknowledge the paradox demonstrated by Nagurney (2000b) and Yin and Lawphongpanich (2006) that an improvement in travel time might paradoxically increase traffic emission). Thus both system time and system cost are meaningful criteria for evaluating system performance. Yang and Huang (2004) examined the multi-class multi-criteria (cost versus time) network equilibrium and system optimum problem in a network with a discrete VOT distribution and fixed travel demand. They studied the cost-based and the time-based system optimization (SO) problems separately. That is, they studied the minimization of system cost without consideration of system time, and then studied the minimization of system time but ignored system cost.
In this paper, we propose to consider the two criteria for system optimization simultaneously.
Specifically, we adopt a discrete VOT distribution model with fixed travel demand, and introduce a bi-objective minimization problem of system time and system cost. Using the theories of multi-objective optimization, we identify a Pareto optimal solution set and the corresponding objective value set (the Pareto optimal frontier) in our bi-objective optimization problem. Each point on the Pareto optimal frontier is a Pareto optimum where a bi-criteria system optimum is established in the sense that neither system time nor system cost can be further reduced without increasing the other one. After establishing the bi-criteria Pareto optimum, we then examine the question of whether or not we can always find positive anonymous link tolls (the same amount of toll levied on each link for all user classes) to decentralize a Pareto system optimum. We provide a positive answer to this question by rigorous analysis. Note that, in our study context we have to consider a pricing scheme with anonymous link tolls, because users differ from one another in VOT only, which is observationally indistinguishable, and thus toll differentiation across user classes is unrealistic and difficult to implement in reality.
Our subsequent concern in this paper is the system performance discrepancy between the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. System time and system cost are both weighted summations of the travel times of all user classes, and thus differ from each other only to a bounded extent. We explore the extent to which the system performance measures differ between the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. Specifically, we answer the following questions. When system time is minimized at the time-based SO, how far could the corresponding system cost deviate from its minimum value achieved at the cost-based SO?
Conversely, when system cost is minimized at the cost-based SO, how far could the corresponding system time deviate from its minimum value achieved at the time-based SO?
More generally, how far can the system time and system cost at a given bi-criteria Pareto optimum deviate from their respective single-criterion based system optimum? We show that the Pareto optimal system time and cost achieve their maximum deviations from optimum when the other objective is optimized. We also establish a meaningful upper bound of the product of the two maximum deviations, which can be solely determined by users' VOT distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides preliminaries on the multi-class network optimization and pricing problems. Section 3 introduces the bi-criteria Pareto optimum concept, and proves that any Pareto optimum can be supported as multi-class UE by positive anonymous link tolls. Section 4 bounds the system performance discrepancy between the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
Preliminaries on multi-class network optimization and pricing problems
In the presence of multiple user classes with different VOT, the system travel disutility can be measured either in time unit (time-based disutility or total system travel time) by
or in cost or monetary unit (cost-based disutility or total system monetary cost) by
Clearly, both the time-based and the cost-based system disutilities can be regarded as weighted sums of the travel times of all user classes in the network. The former has a uniform weighting factor equal to unity, while the latter has non-uniform weighting factors equal to the VOT of respective user classes. As said earlier, system cost C is more meaningful for economists and system time T is usually used by engineers; both T and C are meaningful criteria for network optimization.
For simplicity, let  be the feasible set of path flows defined as
With the definition of T and C , the time-based SO problem is formulated as
and the cost-based SO problem is formulated as
The system optimal flows given by the above SO problems are generally different from the equilibrium flows in the absence of toll pricing, because each user tries to minimize her own travel time. Thus congestion pricing has to be introduced to decentralize an SO or other second-best target flow pattern into (or support it as) a multi-class UE flow pattern. That is, a tolling system can alter the generalized travel disutility of links and paths faced by each class of users, and thereby induce new multi-class UE flow patterns, which are exactly the target (SO or other second-best) flow patterns. 
The corresponding generalized travel cost ,c m rw c is defined as (time is converted into money, and the superscript 'c' stands for cost):
With a toll scheme u implemented, the time-based UE conditions can be written (in time
and the cost-based UE conditions are (in monetary unit) It is well known (e.g. Yang and Huang, 2004 ) that the multi-class UE problem can be formulated as the following equivalent minimization problem:
Observe that objective function (14) is unique. Since v is unique, the system time T at equilibrium given by (3) is unique. The uniqueness of system cost C at equilibrium is not obvious but can be shown below.
Multiplying both sides of (12) and (13) 
Bi-criteria Pareto system optimum and Pareto optimal link toll
As mentioned before, both system time T and system cost C are meaningful measure of system performance. Nevertheless, previous researches on network pricing optimization typically consider only minimization of either T or C (Yang and Huang, 2004 ). Here we shall consider minimization of T and C simultaneously. Thus we have the following bi-objective minimization problem, which combines the two SO problems (6) and (7).
Instead of seeking for optimal flow patterns of minimizing T or C , this bi-objective problem (16) is to seek for a Pareto optimal solution set, which determines a Pareto optimal frontier of the two objective values. As an illustration, Figure 1 plots a typical Pareto optimal frontier (also referred to as "efficient frontier") for problem (16) in the   , T C two-dimensional space. It should be mentioned that the feasible region of the objective value   , T C is generally nonconvex due to the nonconvexity of   C f (Yang and Huang, 2005; Engelson and Lindberg, 2006) .
As seen in Figure 1 , the Pareto optimal frontier of problem (16) 
f , and at least one of
The simplest way to solve bi-objective problem (16) is the so called weighted sum method,
i.e. to solve a single objective problem as follows.
With different nonnegative weights 1  and 2  , problem (17) leads to different Pareto optima. Nonetheless, it is well known (e.g. Miettinen, 1999) that the weighted sum method may not be able to solve for every Pareto optimum when the multi-objective problem is nonconvex, as is the case of our bi-objective problem (16). As illustrated in Figure 2 , the objective contour lines of the weighted-sum problem (17) ,   or whatever slope of contour line is adopted, some points on the Pareto optimal frontier (the concave part, as shown in Figure 2 ) can never be optimal to the weighted-sum minimization problem (17). This means that some Pareto optima can never be obtained by the weighted sum method. For a nonconvex multi-objective problem, several methods are available for finding every Pareto optimum (Miettinen, 1999) . Here we shall use the so called  -constraint method to solve our nonconvex bi-objective minimization problem (16). In this method, one objective function is selected to be optimized and the other objective function is converted into a constraint by setting an upper bound. Specifically, we shall solve the following problem.
where T  is a predefined upper bound of the system time. As illustrated in Figure 3 , by setting different values to T  , each point on the Pareto optimal frontier can be obtained. problems to obtain the set of nonnegative anonymous link toll patterns which can induce the time-based SO. In this section we first generalize their method of "primal-dual LP" to any feasible target link flow pattern and then apply the method to our Pareto system optimum. 
Decentralization of a given feasible target link flow pattern
In words, constraint (21) means that the aggregate link flow should be v . Thus LP (20)- (21) is to minimize the system cost with respect to class-specific path and link flows subject to the aggregate link flow being equal to v .
In view of the constraint set   f defined in (5), the dual formulation of LP (20)- (21) 
According to the duality theory, at the optimal points of the primal and dual LP, the following complementary slackness conditions hold:
Observe that the optimality conditions (25)- (26) are simply the cost-based UE conditions (12) - (13) (20)- (21) and (22)- (23), both having solutions and thus having optimal solutions. Consider a pair of primal-dual optimal solutions f and   , λ μ , and let   u λ be a toll scheme. Then f , u and μ satisfy the optimality conditions (25)- (26), which are just the UE conditions under toll scheme   u λ , thus f is a UE path flow and v is the UE link flow under toll scheme   u λ . Therefore, v is supported as a UE link flow by toll scheme   u λ .
Because a  is unrestricted in sign, toll scheme   u λ can have positive and negative link tolls. This completes the proof. ♦ Theorem 1 requires that link tolls can be "positive or negative". Yang and Huang (2004) showed the existence of positive link tolls to decentralize a cost or time-based SO link flow pattern into a multi-class UE, but this conclusion can not be generalized to any feasible link flow pattern that may have to resort to negative link tolls. Even in the case of homogeneous users, negative link toll is sometimes necessary to induce a feasible link flow pattern, as shown in Bai et al. (2006) by a simple example.
Once an aggregate link flow pattern is given, the system time is uniquely determined, nevertheless, the system cost is undetermined but dependent on the class-specific link flows that constitute the given aggregate link flows. Fortunately, if an anonymous tolling scheme is implemented to support a target link flow v as a multi-class UE flow, the resulting UE class-specific flow f solves LP (20)- (21) for given v (as the UE conditions are equivalent to the LP optimality conditions), which means that f minimizes the system cost under v .
To sum up, we have The intuition behind this lemma is that, under any anonymous link toll scheme, users with higher VOT tend to choose routes with lower travel times by paying higher toll charges, thus the system cost, C , which is exclusive of toll charge and given as the sum of the travel times of all user classes weighted by their VOT, is naturally minimized. The implication of the lemma is that, when analyzing congestion charge in the presence of user heterogeneity, we shall concentrate on the aggregate link flow rather than the class-specific flow, because the latter is self-optimized by the anonymous link tolls.
Existence of nonnegative anonymous link tolls for a given Pareto system optimum
After establishing Theorem 1 for decentralizing any feasible target link flow pattern with anonymous positive or negative link tolls, we now turn our attention to a Pareto optimum of the bi-objective system optimization problem. First note that, although applied for any feasible target link flow pattern, Theorem 1 can not be simply said to be valid for a Pareto system optimum, because the solution to bi-objective minimization problem (16) 
optimal. This completes the proof. ♦ Note that Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 already ensure the existence of anonymous link tolls to induce a Pareto system optimum. We now further prove the existence of nonnegative anonymous link tolls. This is meaningful because negative tolls (subsidies) on road networks are difficult and seldom implemented by policy makers in reality.
Theorem 2. A Pareto system optimum can be supported as a multi-class UE by nonnegative anonymous link tolls.
Proof: Consider a Pareto optimal flow f , and let v be the corresponding aggregate link flow. With Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that there exists a nonnegative anonymous link toll scheme u under which the UE link flow is v . To do this, for the given link flow v , we construct a modified version of the primal LP (20)- (21) with the equality constraint (21) replaced by the following inequality constraint
Because constraint (27) is a simple relaxation of constraint (21) and other constraints remain unchanged, the feasible region of the new LP is expanded and hence nonempty. This means that the new LP and its dual LP have solutions. The new dual formulation is given by (22) - (23) adding an additional constraint
where In this section we shall explore the maximum extent to which the system performances vary when alternative Pareto system optimum is considered. Specifically, let P f denote a Pareto optimal flow, and T f and C f be the time-based and the cost-based SO flows, respectively.
Further, let min T and min C denote the minimum possible system time and system cost that are realized, respectively, at time-based and cost-based SO, i.e. To measure the deviation, we define the following two ratios, called system performance deviation factors: 
 
Substituting (43) and (44) into (42) gives (41). ♦ 
Conclusions
For a traffic network with heterogeneous users and fixed demand, system time and system cost are two meaningful measures of system performance. Thus, there are two objectives of network optimization, i.e. to minimize system time and to minimize system cost. This paper considered these two objectives simultaneously by introducing a bi-objective minimization problem and exploring bi-criteria Pareto optimum. We proved that a bi-criteria Pareto optimum can always be supported as a multi-class UE by positive anonymous link tolls. We also observe that: when dealing with pricing optimization with heterogeneous users, it suffices to concentrate on the aggregate link flows rather than the class-specific path or link flows, because the latter will be automatically optimized by the anonymous link toll schemes.
In an attempt to understand how system cost and system time vary with alternative Pareto system optimum including the time-based and the cost-based SO cases, we introduced two system performance deviation factors and established a meaningful upper bound of their product. The upper bound is solely determined by users' VOT distribution, i.e. the ratio of the highest to the lowest VOT among all user classes. It should be mentioned that these results are independent of network topology and travel time functions.
